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Abstract 
Neoconservatism has been clearly visible in domestic American politics since the late 
1960s, though it has only come to the fore internationally in recent years due to the 
heavily neoconservative influenced direction of the Bush administration in its 
formative years after 9/11, principally through its prosecution of its War on Terror 
and via the rhetoric of the President himself. As a much misunderstood term, subject 
to media jingoism and heated partisan rhetoric in every corner of the globe, this 
article establishes exactly what neoconservatism is in relation to foreign policy via a 
reading of key neoconservative literature and corresponding critiques. Subsequently, 
using the Bush administration as an example, the article evaluates how 
neoconservative foreign policy postulates are transferred into reality during the War 
on Terror. Finally the analysis reaches beyond the Bush administration establishing 
whether a neoconservative legacy remains active in the present day under the Obama 
administration. 
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eoconservatism is something of a chimera in modern politics. For its opponents it is 
a distinct political movement which emphasizes the blending of military power with 
Wilsonian idealism (Mearsheimer 2005), yet for its supporters it is more of a 
‘persuasion’  that  individuals  of  many  types  drift into and out of (Kristol 1995, ix). Regardless 
of which explanation is more correct than the other, it is now widely accepted that the 
neoconservative impulse has been visible in modern American foreign policy, particularly 
within the George W. Bush administration, and that it has left a distinct impact. This article 
will first explore the neoconservative ideology as it applies to foreign policy, establishing the 
domestic foundations on which it was built. Secondly, examples of the implementation of 
neoconservative ideas into reality will then be analysed, most notably through the 
examination of the War on Terror, and the relationship between America and Israel. Finally, 
the article will assess whether after a change of administration in 2009, any of the 
neoconservative legacy remains alive in American politics. 
                                                        
1 The author wishes to express thanks for the perceptive comments made on the first draft of this article by the 
two anonymous reviewers. 
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NEOCONSERVATISM 
Neoconservatism became a distinct ideology, or persuasion, in the aftermath of the cultural 
unrest and university riots in the United States during the late 1960s. A group of largely 
working class Jewish American intellectuals based in New York, most notably Irving Kristol, 
interpreted the situation at the time as modern liberalism attacking its own foundations and 
moral integrity in favour of mass  social  revisionism.  In  Kristol’s  own  words: 
“Liberals   were   wrong,   liberals   are   wrong,   because   they   are   liberals.   What   is   wrong   with  
liberalism is liberalism – a metaphysics and a mythology that is woefully blind to human and 
political  reality”  (Murray  2005, 45). 
For Kristol, then, reality was such that mankind was naturally evil. Socialism had failed, 
so the solution was the pursuit of a non secular liberal democracy that addressed the crisis of 
relativism (Murray 2005, 46-47). To paraphrase Allan Bloom, American minds had become 
so open that they had become closed (Bloom 1987, 337-339). The early neoconservatives 
sought to reorient the United States domestic politics by harnessing the readymade moral 
foundations that religion provided, without necessarily being religious themselves, and 
mould that together with Platonist ideology via the reading provided by Leo Strauss. Indeed 
Strauss is often cited as the ideological father of neoconservatism, although within the 
persuasion his influence is often downplayed (Murray 2005, 37). The use of religion was 
simply due to the fact that the Judeo-Christian moral package provided a clear sense of right 
and wrong that could be harnessed. Finding morality through secularist ideals would lead to 
moral bankruptcy, crime and underachievement (Kristol 1995, 365). In the true Platonic 
sense, the neoconservatives had realised what was best for America and they felt it their duty 
to steer the misguided populace, and later the world via neoconservative application in 
foreign policy, to their senses.  
Having found an identity in the domestic political sphere, foreign policy postulates 
followed. Irving Kristol describes three central pillars: a strong idea of patriotism, a round 
rejection of anything resembling or pointing towards a world government, including round 
rejection of the United Nations and NATO – which   were   “on   their   way   to   becoming 
moribund”  (Kristol  2003, 367), and finally the view that statesmen should clearly distinguish 
friends from enemies (Kristol 2003, 2). These pillars are fused with a strong Manichean 
morality that compels America to use its power for the common good rather than reserve it.  
This  would  become  viscerally  clear   in  Bush’s  War  on  Terror,  but   it   can  be   identified  as   far  
back as in the early Reagan and late Carter administrations according to Francis Fukuyama 
(2006, 45). In direct opposition to the timely practice of realpolitik in foreign affairs, the 
foreign policy of a country must represent its internal moral character. Maintaining alliances 
with dictators and unfavourable regimes is therefore abhorrent to neoconservatism. 
Therefore,  American  power  has  been  and  could  be  used  for  ‘moral’  purposes.  Iraq  is  the  stock  
example in the contemporary era and highlights clearly through the practice of regime 
change and democratisation, aided by interventionist military force, how neoconservatism 
applies to modern foreign policy. Neoconservatism holds the domestic and international 
sphere to a clear moral and ideological standard and champions the use of militarism to 
further   that   standard  globally.   It  does  not   ignore  soft  power   issues,  but  rather,   “when  your  
only tool is a hammer, all problems look  like  nails”  (Fukuyama  2006, 63). Put more plainly, 
“the  world  is  adrift,  and  for  our  safety  it  needs to be moored”  (Murray  2005, 55). At the turn 
of the century Neoconservatives believed that they alone possessed the moral and ideological 
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foundations to successfully direct international relations towards the benefit of all and that 
the United States was blessed with the unique opportunity to prosecute such an endeavour: 
“Americans   should   understand   that   their   support   for   American   pre-eminence is as much a 
strike for international justice as any people is capable of  making”  (Kagan  &  Kristol  2000, 24).  
In the post Cold War era, neoconservatism identifies closely with The End of History? 
thesis (Fukuyama 1989). This presupposes that liberal democracy will spread globally in the 
wake of the West emerging triumphant in the Cold War, rendering all opposing political 
orientations obsolete. The support for democratisation and the spread of liberal institutions 
into non Western areas seems fairly conventional when applied alongside Kantian 
cosmopolitanism   and   Doyle’s   ‘democratic   peace   thesis’,   however   it   obtains its distinctive 
neoconservative flavour when the use of interventionist military policies to affect 
democratisation of a certain target nation are used to affect and artificially accelerate that 
process. Indeed, it is the application of this strategy that has caused mass critique of the Bush 
foreign policy package in the post September 11 world. In 2006, writing on the War on Terror 
which   he   describes   as   “predominantly   shaped   by   neoconservatives”   (2006, 3), Francis 
Fukuyama abandoned his neoconservative persuasion and condemned the use of morality 
and ideology in foreign policy precisely because America has no remaining moral credibility 
in the Middle East as a result of past and present actions (2006, 187). That lack of credibility 
has demonstrably lowered American international standing and led to suspicion that the 
democratisation efforts are a veil for imperialism and a means to control access to the oil 
reserves of the Middle East, representing an essentially unchanged regional policy from that 
of the Cold War era. As the idea of democratisation has both predated and survived the 
neoconservative era of the Bush administration, justifiable suspicion remains regarding its 
legitimacy now that it has been tainted with the fallout from the War on Terror through its 
faltering applications in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
THE NEOCONSERVATIVE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 
The events of September 11 provided the opportunity for those with a neoconservative 
persuasion to gain prominence in the Bush administration as they were able to offer a 
readymade logic with which to view the new post 9/11 era and could point to a legacy of 
literature and. For much of the 1990s, neoconservative literature was expanding in 
opposition to the New World Order of peace, offering the view that this peace was deceptive. 
It thus claimed that America should use The Unipolar Moment (Krauthammer 1990) to 
create a unipolar era of unrivalled American power projected globally (Kagan 2002, 136-
138). This school of thought, although a seemingly marginal position, is validated at least in 
part by many leading neo-liberal academics. John Ikenberry acknowledged that the global 
order   is  an  American  System  based  on  the  proviso  that  “the  United  States  makes   its  power  
safe for the world and in return the world agrees to live within the American   system”  
(Ikenberry 2001, 21). Krauthammer describes the American system more vividly: 
“unashamedly   laying   down   the   rules   of   world   order   and   being   prepared   to   enforce   them”  
(Krauthammer 1990, 33). Both express no desire for this to change, but Ikenberry does 
contemplate the potential danger of the overzealous projection of American power 
recognising  that  “all   this could  go  sour”  (Ikenberry  2001, 31). The souring of this system is 
the moving away from the multilateral and inclusive posture of the elder Bush (Bush 1) and 
Clinton administrations towards the unilateral flavoured and confrontational nature of the 
George W. Bush administration.  
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To depart momentarily into International Relations semantics, Michael Lind 
emphasizes the difference between neoliberal institutionalism – within which he situates 
Ikenberry and former President Bill Clinton, and neoliberal internationalism. Neoliberal 
internationalism   is,   in   Lind’s   description,   an evolution of the Roosevelt tradition of self 
determination and non aggression as the bedrock of international affairs – a similar view to 
the one upheld by George H. W. Bush. Human Rights, global market liberalisation, and 
democratisation; all wedded to neoliberal institutionalism. They are loftier goals   “which  
should  all  be  promoted  by  exhortation  rather  than  coercion”  (Lind 2006). There is no need to 
resort to conceptual stretching to identify here a similarity between neoliberal 
institutionalism and neoconservatism. Both point towards American global hegemony, albeit 
in different ways. Lind makes this point in expressing that the only difference between the 
two is that neoliberals are dishonest about admitting their intentions for American power, 
whilst neoconservatives are open about it. The divergence is over what kind of empire 
America should have; one disguised through using multilateral institutions and soft power to 
hide the true reality of American global domination, or a global empire backed by the open 
use of hard power and unilateralism. Nevertheless, both end goals are in fact similar, which 
again raises concerns over the true legitimacy of such currently active American foreign 
policy   goals   as   democratisation.   Lind’s   position   is   an   interesting   nuance,   and   one   that  
suggests that there is much more of a logical flow from Clinton to Bush in their approach to 
foreign policy, despite the perceived change in structure after 9/11.  
Neoconservatives lamented the Clinton years as a period in which America did not 
capitalise on a once in a lifetime chance to cement its leading position in the world while it 
stood without any serious competitor. Colin Powell, for example, condemned the Clinton 
foreign policy decision making process as no more than “a coffee house chatting session” with 
no dominant voice propelling it (Brzezinski 2007, 87). The fundamental blow that 9/11 struck 
to the national consciousness was an opportunity to push for a new direction for America and 
awaken the political establishment from its post Cold War slumber. Quickly after 9/11 
President Bush became a convert to the neoconservative persuasion, something clearly 
visible in his West Point speech of 2002, and even more so in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy. Both publicly outlined the new Bush foreign policy direction and re-introduced 
neoconservatism to mainstream American foreign policy. At West Point, Bush made the 
seminal remark: 
“We  cannot  put  our  faith  in  the  word  of  tyrants,  who  solemnly  sign  non-proliferation treaties, 
and then systematically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited 
too  long”  (Bush  2002).   
This statement introduced the policy of preemptive force as a proactive feature of 
American foreign policy although in both its subsequent use and its description, it was more 
correctly a policy of preventive force – which is a degree of magnitude above preemption and 
holds greater implications for the structure of the international system, and via international 
law is widely interpreted as illegal. Later in the same speech, Bush invokes an extreme moral 
absolutism:  
“Some  worry  that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and 
wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. 
Moral  truth  is  the  same  in  every  culture,  in  every  time,  and  in  every  place”  (Bush 2002).  
Binding the idea of a moral purpose to foreign policy is not unusual in American 
politics. However, using it so prominently to define the emerging War on Terror, taken 
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together  with  Bush’s  public  disregard  for  multilateral  institutions  and  his  unilateral posture, 
is without doubt inspired if not directly underwritten by a significant dose of 
neoconservatism.  
Combining the   neoconservative   persuasion   and   the   Bush   administration’s   policies  
further, the 2002 National Security Strategy stated that “the  war…   is  a  global  enterprise  of  
uncertain  duration”   (The  National  Security  Strategy  of   the  United  States  of  America (NSS) 
2002, iii)  and  that  “the  only  path  to  peace  and  security  is  the  path  of  action”  (NSS  2002, IV). 
In the 2006 NSS, President Bush continued the neoconservative rhetoric despite ongoing 
difficulty   and   loss   of   support   in   Iraq   stating   that   America   has   chosen   “leadership   over  
isolationism”  and  endeavours  to  “shape  the  world,  not  merely  be  shaped  by   it”  (NSS  2006, 
iii). Much was made of a supposed   ‘return   to   realism’   from   2006   onwards,   most   notably  
watermarked by the departure of Donald Rumsfeld from the Pentagon. However, despite a 
generally more nuanced rhetoric from the White House owing to increased domestic 
opposition, falling approval ratings and the Iraq quagmire, the general thrust of the foreign 
policy package was retained. Additionally, the 2006 NSS document did not simply repeat the 
vague and generalistic language of the 2002 documents but contained clear and specific 
threats  to  ‘rogue  states’  such  as  Iran.  Furthermore,  it maintained the provision to extend the 
use of preventive military action.   
NEOCONSERVATISM AND ISLAM 
In order to understand the neoconservative focus on the Middle East at the expense of other 
geo-political theatres, and to explain the receptiveness of George W. Bush to their persuasion, 
an examination of the controversial works of two academics is necessary: Bernard Lewis and 
Samuel Huntington. Lewis, a neoconservative, was received at the White House by Karl Rove 
in November 2001 in order to discuss the subject of his thesis which states that as the current 
Middle   Eastern   status   quo   was   created   by   ‘Imperial   partition’   drawn   over   and   through  
ancient civilisations, there is a legacy of instability in the region (Lewis 2004, 417). He 
therefore asserts that this unresolved clash of identities must be addressed as a priority as 
there are only two possible solutions to the ongoing instability of the region: either Islam or 
democracy (Lewis 2004, 423). Islam, with its own unique set of legal principles enshrined in 
Sharia Law is at odds with liberal democracy and, according to Lewis’s  reading, is therefore 
mutually exclusive and incompatible. Conflict is therefore inevitable. The established 
contemporary American position towards the Middle East was primarily status quo oriented. 
Iraq’s  advance into Kuwait was repelled but no regime change was attempted; it resulted in 
the  Gulf  War  doing  no  more  than  restoring  the  status  quo.  Clinton’s  whole  approach  to  Iran  
and Iraq was based on containment and sanctions, not regime change – again perpetuating 
the   status   quo.   If   Lewis’s   controversial   thesis   was   correct,   these   policies   were   enabling   a  
ticking time bomb to threaten America. 
Following on, Huntington, who is not a neoconservative, borrows the words of Hedley 
Bull who stated that the West’s  ‘apogee’  was  1900.  Since  then  it  has  been slowly declining in 
stature and influence. Bull predicted that as Europe declined after the major World Wars, 
America would follow suit in the near future as part of a larger inevitable process of 
rebalancing internationally (Huntington 1997, 83). Huntington wants to categorically dismiss 
the validity of the neoliberal ‘End of History’ argument by re-emphasising the possible 
decline   of   the   West   in   line   with   Bull’s   prediction.   In   Huntington’s   eyes   a   determined  
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opposition by the other civilisation groupings, most notably those connected with Islam, in a 
fight for the survival of their (incompatible) way of life through a clash of civilisations is 
possible – as is the mirrored possibility of a pre-emptive  fight  by  the  ‘West’  to  halt  their  own  
decline. The author thereby develops Lewis’s  thesis  of  a   future  run either by democracy, or 
Islam. It is not a wild leap to view the War on Terror as symptomatic of this as viewed from 
both sides of the fence. This helps to understand why the views expressed in the 
neoconservative literature thus far analysed that advocated the need for American dominance 
and unrivalled strength were seen as necessary, and seen as all the more urgent after 9/11. 
From this perspective, American policy towards the Middle East would have to change 
significantly, and it did. 
Iran   is   the   only   logical   candidate   for   a   leader   of   such   a   theoretical   ‘Islamic   force’   to  
oppose  the   ‘West’.  A  nuclear  armed  Iran  would  make that threat more alarming; and given 
the blurring of the lines between proliferation, state sponsored terrorism, and the rise in 
religious extremism in the post 9/11 era, Iran would become an existential threat for the 
United States and its designs for the Middle East. Of course this train of thought grossly 
underestimates  the  deep  divisions  in  the  Islamic  world,  prominently  the  Shi’a  composition  of  
Iran (as opposed to the vast majority of Muslims belonging to the Sunni branch of Islam) and 
their predominantly Persian rather than Arab ethnicity. Nevertheless, Norman Podhoretz 
insists   that   America   must   take   military   action   to   end   Iran’s   nuclear   programme.   This   is  
necessary as September 11th marked the beginning of World War IV (the Cold War being the 
third) and Islamofascism is merely the most recent mutation of the totalitarian disease that 
has plagued the Twentieth Century (Podhoretz 2007, 17). America must destroy Iran to stop 
it   creating   an   “Islamofascist”   world   order   (Podhoretz   2007, 20). Extreme as it is, this 
sentiment was directly voiced by Bush in 2005:  
“The   militants   believe   that   controlling   one   country   will   rally   the   Muslim   masses,   enabling  
them to overthrow all moderate governments in the region and establish a radical Islamic empire 
that  spans  from  Spain  to  Indonesia”2 
That Islamic Empire, an Islamic Caliphate, dedicated to bringing Islamic law and 
teachings to the entire world, is the manifestation of the fears of Podhoretz. It precisely 
underlines the extremity of the neoconservative world view, the reason for the focus on the 
Middle East, and the significant departure neoconservative doctrine represents from the 
traditional liberal and realist dichotomy in foreign policy. 
John Ikenberry offers an extensive critique of neoconservatism, noting that far from 
creating  a  unipolar  era,  it  experienced  only  a  ‘moment’  in  the  limelight  before  failing  visibly  
in 2004. For Ikenberry, Iraq was a geostrategic failure; the ideology of the War on Terror was 
unsustainable politically and financially; American military might had been miscalculated; 
unipolarity is not legitimate when weighed against multipolarity, nor is preemption; and the 
neoconservative ideology is unstable, crude and ethnocentric (Ikenberry 2004, 8-19). 
Ikenberry derides the persuasion as fundamentalist stating conclusively that “their  history  is  
defective, their policies   ineffective”   (Ikenberry   2004, 20). This rejection is derived from a 
reading  that  places  high  credence  in  the  two  ‘grand  bargains’  of the global system: the realist 
idea of security and stability, and the liberal institutionalism that tempers that realism. This 
duopoly makes American power safe for the world (in theory), and it is through the upsetting 
of this delicate balance that the neoconservative persuasion of the Bush Presidency has not 
only highlighted the illegitimacy of that persuasion through its actions, but perhaps 
                                                        
2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/americas/4316698.stm 
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irreparably damaged faith in the entire system (Ikenberry 2001, 19-22). The neoconservatives 
themselves do not believe they are fundamentalists per se, but rather that they observe a 
danger that others ignore: 
“Events  of  recent  years  have  given  us  no  reason  to  change  our  fundamental  view either of the 
emerging dangers or of the prescriptions for meeting those dangers. If anything, the trend of the 
past few years has proven more troubling than  we  anticipated”  (Kagan  2000, vii). 
The realist critique of the neoconservative doctrine in foreign policy is perhaps the most 
persuasive one. John Mearsheimer offers a similar critique of the legitimacy of 
neoconservatism to Ikenberry, but contextualises his dissent: 
“The   dispute   about   whether   to   go   to   war   in   Iraq   was   between   two   competing   theories   of 
international   politics:   realism   and   the   neoconservatism   that   underpins   the   Bush   doctrine”  
(Mearsheimer 2005). 
Rather than simply stating that neoconservatism underpins the Bush doctrine, he goes 
on to assert that both are essentially the same thing: a merger of idealism and power in 
foreign affairs described as “Wilsonianism  with  teeth”  (Mearsheimer 2005). He accuses the 
Bush doctrine of presuming that the preemptive exercise of American power will produce a 
domino  effect  persuading  other  nations  such  as  Iran  to  surrender  to  America’s  will,  when  in  
fact timely honoured realist thinking has shown that the likely outcome would rather be a 
militarization of said nations to protect their sovereignty and attempt to balance American 
power (Mearsheimer 2005). In this instance, the realist critique of neoconservative foreign 
policy has so far proven incredibly accurate as Iran actively continues to develop nuclear 
technology and adopts an increasingly belligerent posture towards America and Israel. Iraq 
and Afghanistan are now arguably failed states and terrorism and violence in the region has 
escalated dramatically as an advertisement from the op-ed page of the New York Times on 26 
September 2002 predicted in advance. This was signed by 33 scholars of international 
relations including Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Developing the critique further, 
the Wilsonian core of the neoconservative ideology, enshrined in democracy promotion as a 
foreign policy tool, is cited as an ambitious failure: “this  was   to  be   social   engineering  on  a  
massive  scale  and  it  was  to  be  done  with  a  mailed  fist”  (Mearsheimer  2005).   
The failure was in overlooking the important realist postulate that to citizens of any 
nation, nationalism and sovereignty are more powerful and carnal than loftier ideas of 
democracy. Hence, it is entirely inkeeping with realpolitik to view the Iranian quest to 
develop an independent nuclear deterrent as a rational choice in line with seeking a credible 
deterrence from American or Israeli militarily-enforced regime change. Hence, the entire 
episode of neoconservatism as applied to the Middle East can be validly read as a self 
fulfilling prophecy.  
Even those within the neoconservative persuasion who accept that the exercise of 
neoconservative foreign policy has not heralded the intended results plead for its 
continuation, to finish the job, so that the rest of the world can look back in posterity and see 
that they were right. The legitimacy of that point of view, as expressed most passionately by 
Podhoretz through his pleas to bomb Iran and enact a regime change strategy there to jump 
start the democracy domino in the Middle East, remains to be seen – and remains vocally 
active even in the Obama era. It is impossible to predict the future; even realism could not do 
that in the case of the sudden ending of the Cold War. However, realism survived that failure 
and perhaps neoconservatism will survive the apparent failure amongst popular consensus. 
McGlinchey, S. “Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy” Politikon (IAPSS) 16.1 2010: 21-33 
 
 28 
 Whilst not wishing to roundly condemn neoconservative postulates, taken at face value 
as those postulates were in the Bush administration, it certainly seems a very hard case to 
answer for. The Iraq quagmire was forewarned by the 33 scholars, yet it was pursued. The 
failure of the democratisation domino effect was widely predicted, yet Afghanistan and Iraq 
linger in a worse state than prior to invasion and the Middle East is experiencing growing 
anti-Americanism and increased terrorism in countries such as Pakistan. The core 
neoconservative  tenet  of  distinguishing  friends  from  enemies  and  the  ‘with  us  or  against  us’  
rhetoric that followed from it throughout the Bush administration has stretched the alliance 
with traditional allies in the European Union and, as Ikenberry points out, damaged the 
delicate grand bargain of American power tempered with multilateral legitimacy. Such 
damage has been actively acknowledged by the Obama administration as from day one it 
sought to roll back to a more multilateral, inclusive and diplomatic position internationally, 
more in line with the American position professed by Ikenberry. Obama even won a Nobel 
Peace Prize for his initial efforts, which was no doubt a political seal of approval for the 
anticipated end of the Bush era of unilateralism. However in reality, the changes have turned 
out to be much more subtle. 
THE ISRAEL FACTOR IN NEOCONSERVATISM 
The core postulate of Bush’s   neoconservative foreign policy package, revolutionary 
democratisation,   is   intricately   tied   to   Israel’s   security.   Israeli  politicians  have   long  stressed  
that  they  live  in  a  ‘tough  neighbourhood’  and  frequently  stake  their  claim  to  be  the  only  truly  
democratic nation in a sea of dictatorships and corrupt regimes. Both the domestic Israel 
lobby and the Bush administration believed toppling Saddam Hussein would lead to a 
domino effect of democratisation that would simultaneously fulfil the aims of increasing 
Israel’s   security  and   the  wider  aims  of   the  Bush  doctrine3. In that sense, Mearsheimer and 
Walt (2007) argue that the lobby was the key variable in making the Iraq war happen when it 
joined the neoconservative chorus.  
Where this applies to Iran is ever more important. Mearsheimer and Walt postulate 
that the lobby was equally as concerned, even as far back as the Clinton years, with Iran. In a 
pragmatic way the various groups in the lobby understood the neoconservative desire to deal 
with  Iraq  first  (see  Perle  1999),  yet  read  the  Bush  administration’s  intent  as  one  of  enforcing  
regime change in Iraq and then Iran in quick succession. Hence the frustration when this did 
not occur (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007, 233-234). In reality, Iran provided significant tactical 
support in the Afghanistan campaign. It offered a significant normalisation dialogue with the 
United States in the immediate aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion, presumably fearing it 
could be next at a time when American power appeared to be at its zenith. In all cases, the 
lobby  made   a   “concentrated   effort”   to   spoil   the   process (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007, 282-
302). The authors cite a stream of empirical data to demonstrate their thesis and state: 
“Israel   and   the   lobby…are   the   central   forces   today   behind   all   the   talk   in   the   Bush  
administration   and   on   Capitol  Hill   about   using  military   force   to   destroy   Iran’s   nuclear   facilities”  
(Mearsheimer & Walt 2007, 282). 
According to this estimation, the next President in 2009, despite their particular 
orientation in foreign policy, was just as likely to attack Iran to halt its regional ambitions and 
remove the threat that poses to Israel, as the lobby will continue to shape policy in that 
                                                        
3 See  ‘A  Clean  Break:  A  New  Strategy  for  Securing  the  Realm’.  Available  at:  http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm.  
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particular direction. Having now witnessed the approach of Obama for some 18 months on 
Iran, this prediction has been largely proven accurate, at least in rhetoric if not in action. 
Obama’s  inauguration  year  promise  to  “reach  out  a  hand” to Iran, has been replaced with a 
reappraisal of the Bush approach4. In addition, the publicly announced statement that the 
force option  is  still  “on the table”5, conciliated by the Iranian steadfast desire to not negotiate 
with any good faith on making concessions on its nuclear program.  
Walter Russell Mead states that the growing power of the lobby is a distortion, and 
much of the Israel bias in American foreign policy (which he also recognises) is really the 
result of the significant evangelical rise in American political life. Their desire to fervently 
support Israel is based on their own convictions derived from their particular reading of the 
Bible (Mead 2006, 41).   Indeed,   with   Bush’s   evangelical   orientation,   Mead’s   point   is   well  
advised. Moving on, Gorenberg notes that the influence of the lobby has been overstated; 
being correct in the recognition that they attempt to control American policy – as any lobby 
will naturally do within its sphere of interest – but never really achieves the magnitude of 
success Mearsheimer and Walt credit them with due to the diverse network of competing and 
divergent interests on Capitol Hill (Gorenberg 2008, 32).  Gorenberg’s  point   is   valid   in   the  
sense that the lobby and successive Israeli governments have still not received clear US 
support  for  their  steadfast  desire  to  forcibly  and  urgently  end  Iran’s  nuclear  program,  which  
is   frequently   described   as   an   ‘existential   threat’   to   Israel’s   existence.   Finally,   the  
neoconservative publication, Commentary, published a response to Mearsheimer and Walt, 
rejecting their thesis, stating that it employed anti-Semitic stereotypes and lacked original 
research, relying instead on secondary sources and crass generalisations (Stephens 2007).  
Whilst there is a valid argument to be made that the book does oversimplify and 
perhaps over-emphasize the role of Israel and the lobby on foreign politics in America, it is a 
baseless accusation to accuse the authors of anti-Semitism or bad scholarship. The real 
conflict between the neoconservatives and Mearsheimer and Walt here is most probably 
based on the fact that both authors are prominent realists. Realists, particularly 
Mearsheimer, have provided an acute and sustained critique of the whole neoconservative 
project from the outset. The standard defence of those in the Israel lobby, of which many 
neoconservatives are closely allied (although not all neoconservatives are Jewish), to anyone 
accusing them of wielding a disproportionate influence in foreign policy and of acting in 
interests which are not American, is by ‘playing the anti-Semitic card’. This has been a 
contrived defence strategy that has stunted any serious debate.  
Mearsheimer   and   Walt’s   book   has   finally   allowed   the   issue   to   be   addressed  
academically rather than at the margins of society. Additionally, the stature of its authors has 
allowed for much deeper and wider debate than has been the case previously. The Israel 
lobby thesis visits, yet dismisses, the importance of other lobby interests in the future of the 
Middle East, such as the oil lobby and the arms industry, which comes across as premature. 
Yet despite the apparent flaws, dismissing the thesis out of hand as Commentary predictably 
wishes, is a missed opportunity when attempting to understand the full scope of how 
American policy is forged towards the Middle East. This is especially the case when observing 
the   strikingly   similar   rhetoric   of   both   Israel’s   senior   political   figures   and   the   American 
neoconservatives, most notably regarding Iran.  
 
                                                        
4 For more on this see: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/04/iran_is_no_existential_threat.  
5 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/14/world/main6395688.shtml. 
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CONTINUITY OR CHANGE? 
With a new President in office as of January 2009, Barak Obama and his administration have 
demonstrated a clear desire to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. However, the 
fact remains that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have continued – escalated in some senses 
– and rhetoric on Iran, for example, has progressively hardened despite the early offer of 
constructive dialogue with Iran. It may be fair to ask whether there is much difference in 
practical terms between the Bush and Obama pursuit of Middle Eastern policy. Whether or 
not this can be attributed to a continued active neoconservative influence in the Obama 
administration is doubtful. However, considering the Obama administration inherited such 
deep foreign policy baggage and American military entrenchment in this part of the world, a 
course reversal would be much more extreme than a tacit continuation of the general thrust 
of the previous approach. The decision to keep Robert Gates in the Pentagon is certainly an 
indication of this intent. Whist Obama is clearly not of the neoconservative persuasion, he 
certainly seems to be tacitly sympathetic to the broad logic of the Bush approach in the 
Middle East, or at the very least cognisant that dramatic change would be more disastrous 
politically than continuation.  
Maintained support for the ongoing policy of democratisation in the Middle East may 
prove to be the glue between the two administrations, though in a clear semantic break 
Obama has steered clear of trumpeting the power of democracy as Bush frequently did, 
preferring  to  use  terms  such  as   ‘freedom’  and   ‘development’   in  his  public  rhetoric  (Bouchet  
2010).   This   is   clearly   a   break   in   semantics,   though   not   in   policy,   similar   to   Obama’s  
jettisoning   of   the   term   ‘War   on   Terror’,   as   both   the   War   on   Terror   and   the   American 
democratisation project in the Middle East are evidently continuing apace.  
It is an often observed trend in international politics that foreign policy rarely 
dramatically changes; rather it slowly evolves. President Truman famously declared that he 
saw foreign policy as residing above the partisan divide. In American politics and the politics 
of national security, his words have indeed proven largely accurate. A standard example given 
by historians is the continuation of bipartisan American involvement the Vietnam War across 
five administrations between 1959 and 1975. To take the analysis of continuity deeper, many 
designate Ronald Reagan (an icon for the neoconservatives) for the ramping up of American 
military spending and overturning the decline in strength witnessed in the detente era, which 
in turn led to the eventual economic strangulation of the Soviet Union as it failed to keep up. 
In truth, this process was initiated by Jimmy Carter in 1979-1980. He was infuriated by the 
revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan simply rode the wave and 
carried it forward, and belatedly took credit. Similarly, many attribute Richard Nixon for 
creating   the   ‘twin  pillar’  strategy  of   fortifying  the  Middle  East  by  building  up  Saudi  Arabia,  
and especially Iran, via advanced weaponry sales and military training. This was used to act 
as a buffer for the southward spread of the Soviet Union when the British declared they 
would withdraw their security blanket from the Persian Gulf by 1971. Yet, this process was 
already in motion in the final years of the Johnson administration, and it was more 
accurately a strategy devised and promoted by the Shah of Iran as early as 19656, not by the 
Nixon administration. One final example was in the Eisenhower sanctioned CIA/ British SIS 
coup in Iran in 1953 which reinstated the Shah as ruler of Iran, overthrowing the 
democratically elected nationalist leader, Mohammad Mosaddegh. Many have attributed this 
                                                        
6 See: Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to State. Tehran, December 29, 1965. Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1964-68, Vol. XXII, Iran.  
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decision to the change in President, Eisenhower having replaced Truman, and he was widely 
regarded as leading a much more aggressive administration. However, careful examination of 
the declassified papers revealed that Truman had significant CIA assets and operations active 
in Iran, suggesting much more of a continuity than a change in policy (Marsh 2005).  
Therefore it is often easy to accredit policy changes to a change in leader, but this is 
rarely accurate, and defies the momentum that foreign policy has across administrations and 
across the partisan divide. All previously given examples highlight not only changes in 
administration, but changes in governing party from Democrat to Republican, highlighting 
the comparative ease with which a certain foreign policy course can override standard 
partisanship.   In  Obama’s case, he inherited a foreign policy momentum in the Middle East 
that he has chosen to see through, rather than halt. There have been changes in language and 
posture, such as the careful jettisoning of the  term  ‘War  on  Terror’,  yet  the  general  thrust  of  
the Bush legacy in the region remains intact, in what is surely a bitter pill to swallow for all 
those  who  voted   for   ‘change’   in  November  2008.  Nowhere  can  this  be more visible than in 
the case of Iran as it continues to approach full mastery of the nuclear cycle in defiance of 
steadfast American and Israeli wishes.  
The Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, recently noted that America under 
Obama had not changed from the America of Bush in its foreign policy application in the 
Middle East. Obama has not closed Guantanamo Bay despite promising to do so, has not 
altered   American   refusal   to   countenance   a   truly   independent   Iranian   ‘civilian’   nuclear  
program, and he has not changed course in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Similarly, unconditional 
support for Israel – the frequent demon in Iranian domestic discourse regarding America, 
has been broadly retained, though with some qualifications. Such statements are of course 
true, despite their unpopular source. Cutting through the friendly appearance and 
conciliatory rhetoric of the Obama administration, the Nobel Peace Prize award, and 
considering  its  refusal  to  use  the  term  ‘War  on  Terror’  does  not  detract  from  the  reality  that  
regarding foreign policy towards the Middle East, nothing of substance has indeed changed. 
The   fact   that   arguably   the  world’s  most   notorious   ‘elected’   statesman  has   pointed   towards  
this elephant in the room does not mean that it should be ignored. 
THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE PERSUASION 
Neoconservatism did not accurately perceive American military power, the power of 
democratisation,  or  the  failure  of  the  world’s  population  to  accept  its  ideological  persuasion  
in the midst of convincing evidence to the contrary, particularly as things turned sour in Iraq. 
It seems that far from playing the final act in the end of history, the neoconservative 
persuasion has caused a crisis of legitimacy in the global system. American power is no longer 
seen as legitimate by many, and the jury is still very much out on whether the wave of 
euphoria circulating around the election of Obama has actually gained any long term traction 
in   repairing   the  damage.  The  United  Nations’   normative   and   legal   power  base  was  dealt   a  
serious blow by the Iraq invasion, and Iran did not follow the democratic domino course, 
leading to a popular fear that American actions in the Middle East will actually ignite a clash 
of civilisations.  
That being said, perhaps surprisingly, the Obama administration is broadly continuing 
the Bush, neoconservative inspired, legacy in the Middle East, despite its more multilateral 
and diplomatic persona in international politics and its desire to be viewed as clearly 
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different from its predecessor. The neoconservative persuasion may not have fared well in 
the broad ideological sense, but its general approach as demonstrated in the implementation 
of policy   application  may   have   fared   better.   Neoconservatism’s   approach   of   democratising  
the Middle East via military intervention, tempering terrorism in the area, and dealing with 
Iran   decisively  has   already   formed   the   core   of  Obama’s   policy  package   – all continuations 
from the Bush administration. Barely anything of significance has changed in a practical 
sense,  and  the  continued  standoff  over  Iran’s  nuclear  proliferation  has highlighted this for all 
to see. Barak Obama may have started out intending to pursue a different regional strategy 
than that of George W. Bush, as displayed most clearly in his early dealings with Iran. 
Nonetheless, predictable belligerence and brinkmanship from Iran over continuation of its 
nuclear programme has quickly resulted in the new President having to withdraw his 
invitation to enter into a constructive dialogue and resorting to an approach 
indistinguishable from the one carried by the Bush administration.  
Obama is not a neoconservative; but history may, perhaps surprisingly, record his 
actions in broadly continuing the logic of the ‘War on Terror’  (albeit  by  another  name)  and 
the continuation of the neoconservative plan for the Middle East.  
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